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The  Consumer  Rights  Directive  and  the  proposal  for  a  
regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) :
Do they promote consumer confidence?
Cristina Poncibò 1
Abstract
The purpose of this IUSE working paper is to explore the impacts the Consumer Rights Directive and the  
proposal for an optional Common European Sales Law (CESL) have on the evolution of EU Consumer  
Law. The aim of both the directive and the Common European Sales Law is to boost consumer confidence,  
which  is  inevitable  for  cross-border  transactions.  The  IUSE  working  paper,  first,  introduces  the  new  
legislative  framework  and,  then,  discusses,  by  relying  on  the  results  of  behavioural  economics  about  
consumer contracts, whether consumer confidence in the internal market would be really enhanced by the  
adoption of such measures.
The Consumer Rights Directive
Consumer contracts are extensively regulated under European Law. The next Sections 
aims  to  analyse,  in  particular,  the  CRD  and  the  CESL  to  consider  if  behavioural 
economics has somehow influenced these new measures. In particular, our analysis will 
show the CRD and the CESL do not adequately deal with the above indicated problems of 
information overload - on the contrary, they increase the amount of information – and the 
sunk cost effect. Precisely, especially the pre-contractual phase as designed by the CESL 
increases the time and the efforts to enter the contract and, consequently, it increases the 
sunk cost effect.
Following a three-year legislative process the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) was 
adopted  in  October  2011.2 Less  ambitious  than  the  original  proposals,  the  CRD 
nevertheless  extends  the  maximal  harmonisation  approach  to  a  number  of  aspects 
concerning the pre-contractual information duties and right of withdrawal in business to 
consumer  (B2C)  off-premises  and  distance  contracts  and  also  introduces  other  new 
features to the Consumer Acquis. It represents a conservative consolidation and, thus, its 
contribution to the development of European consumer contract law is therefore deemed 
quite limited by legal scholars.3
The CRD marks the culmination of a lengthy review process of the Consumer Acquis 
relating to contracts.4 The focus is therefore primarily on the internal market, rather than 
on ensuring  an optimum level  of  consumer  protection  for  the  whole  of  the European 
Union  and  it  occasionally  gives  preference  to  trader  interests  rather  than  those  of 
consumers.  It  represents  a  significant  change to  the landscape  of  European Consumer 
Contract Law, and it will replace, as of 13 June 2014, the directives on doorstep selling5, 
1 Cristina Poncibó, lecturer in comparative private law, Department of Law, University of Turin, cristina.poncibo@unito.it
2 Council Directive on consumer rights 2011/83 of 25 October 2011, OJ [2011] L304, 64-88.
3 E. Hondius, 'The Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights: The Emperor’s New Clothes?' (2011) 19 European Review of Private  
Law, Issue 2, pp. 163-166. Kåre Lilleholt, 'Notes on the Proposal for a New Directive on Consumer Rights' (2009) 17 European Review  
of Private Law, Issue 3, pp. 335–343.
4 Council Directive on consumer rights 2011/83 of 25 October 2011, OJ [2011] L304, 64-88.
5 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business  
premises [1985] OJ L 372, 31-33.
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distance selling, unfair terms and consumer sales with one new measure. The directive has 
recently been followed by the adoption of the new timeshare directive.6
“Full  harmonisation”  is  the most  controversial  aspect  of  the directive.7 The  Acquis 
communautaire  on  consumer  contract  law has  developed  very  slowly  and in  a  rather 
piecemeal fashion. It has been criticised widely for its incoherence, as well as the gaps that 
exist. It is regrettable that the Acquis review has not cast its net wider to encompass also 
those  directives,  as  well  as  other  relevant  consumer  directives  such  as  the  Distance 
Marketing of Financial Services Directive (2002/65/EC) and even the Product Liability 
Directive (85/374/EEC). The aim for greater coherence is somewhat undermined by the 
existence of other directives which continue to deal with specific topics using the vertical 
approach. Anyway, the directives to be replaced by the directive on consumer rights are all 
so-called “minimum harmonisation” directives, which means that whilst the directives lay 
down a  minimum level  of  consumer  protection,  there  is  room for  Member  States  to 
maintain  or  introduce  provisions  which  are  more  favourable  to  consumers  than  the 
directive themselves. In order to understand how widely the Member States have availed 
themselves of this opportunity, and to assess the consequences of this, the Commission 
funded a major research project to track the transposition of eight consumer law directives, 
including the four to be replaced by the said directive. This revealed a substantial level of 
variation in national consumer laws, despite the harmonisation effort made by these earlier 
directives. Consequently, the Commission proposed not only to improve the quality of the 
legislation through the adoption of a horizontal measure, but also to abandon the policy of 
minimum harmonisation in favour of a full harmonisation approach. It outlined its plans in 
the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer  Acquis.8 The Green Paper  favoured 
adopting a horizontal approach, rather than reviewing each directive vertically, in order to 
reduce the volume of the Acquis. This would produce a simplified regulatory framework.9 
The  advantage  of  the  horizontal  approach  is  that  the  overall  Acquis  could  be  more 
coherent and, in particular, utilise consistent definitions and terminology. The directive on 
consumer rights takes the horizontal approach and provide common definitions: many of 
them have been broadened to cover a much wider range of transactions, notably those of 
“sales contract”, “service contract”, and “distance contract”, which cover the vast majority 
of all consumer transactions.
However, whilst this might appear to be a positive development, any evaluation needs 
to take into account also the shift to full harmonisation and the substance of its provisions. 
The shift to full harmonisation is stated in Article 4 according to which “Member States 
may not maintain, or introduce, in their national law, provisions diverging from those laid 
down in this directive.” Thus, the directive will fix the level of consumer protection for the 
transactions,  which  fall  within  its  scope,,  with  no  room left  for  regional  or  national 
variation.
6 Council Directive 2008/122/EC of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-
term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts [2009] OJ L 33, 10-30.
7 J. M. Smits, ‘Full Harmonization of Consumer Law? A Critique of the Draft Directive on Consumer Rights’ (2010) 18 ERPL 5,14. M. 
Ebers, ‘From Minimum to Full Harmonization - The Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ (2010) 2 InDret, 1, 47.  W. H. Van 
Boom, ‘The Draft Directive on Consumer Rights: Choices Made and Arguments Used’ (2009) 5 Journal of Contemporary European  
Research 452, 464. Vanessa Mak, 'Review of the Consumer Acquis: Towards Maximum Harmonization?' (2009) 17 European Review 
of Private Law, Issue 1, pp. 55–73.
8 EU Commission Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis, Brussels, 08.02.2007, COM (2006) 744 final.
9 The use of a horizontal directive would, however, appear only to have a limited potential for simplifying the regulatory framework,  
because directives need to be transposed into national law, and Member States are not required to copy out a directive verbatim in one  
single measure.
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The Commission  seeks  to  justify  this  development  on two grounds:  the  first  is  the 
diversity and incoherence  related to the use of the minimum harmonisation  clauses in 
earlier directives; and the second is the provision on consumer contracts in the Rome-I 
Regulation on the law applicable to contracts.10 With regard to the first, the Commission 
argues that there is low confidence in cross-border consumer shopping, and that one of the 
reasons for this  is  the fragmentation of the Acquis and the uneven level  of consumer 
protection across the member states. At the same time, businesses are reluctant to offer 
their goods and services across the internal market because of the differences in consumer 
protection  and  the  need  to  adapt  business  models  to  different  national  markets.  The 
solution therefore is to abandon minimum harmonisation and to adopt one standard across 
the  European  Union.  This  argument  sounds  attractive,  but  some  scepticism has  been 
expressed by legal scholars with regard to the real impact of legal diversity on consumer 
and business confidence: evidently, there are many more practical factors which are more 
likely to act as a deterrent, be it language barriers, lack of trust in unknown businesses, 
concerns regarding the practicality of transporting goods over long distances, as well as 
unease  over  the  prospect  of  satisfactorily  resolving  disputes  across  borders.  Full 
harmonisation will not resolve these problems.11
As for  the  second  reason,  Art.  6  of  the  Rome-I  Regulation  provides  that  the  law 
applicable  to  a  consumer  contract  is  that  of  the  country  of  the  consumer’s  habitual 
residence where the trader either pursues his activities in that country, or directs, by any 
means, his activities to that country (or to several countries including that country). But 
even where the law of the consumer’s habitual residence do not govern the contract, the 
mandatory consumer protection rules of the consumer’s country will still be applicable. 
That being the case, there is still a risk that traders might be reluctant to offer their goods  
or  services  to  certain  countries  if  that  would  mean  having  to  comply  with  different 
consumer  protection  standards.  One  can  question  whether  the  issues  covered  by  the 
directive and primarily full  harmonization will result in a significant increase in cross-
border activity.
Even if the case for full harmonisation is made out at the level of principle, one can 
raise very serious concerns about its opportunity. Consumer law is a  lex specialis which 
effectively derogates from general contract law. The directive will therefore have to slot 
into the legal framework created by national general contract law. It is well known that 
national contract laws differ considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and despite the 
proposal concerning a Common European Sales Law discussed in the next sections, this 
situation  will  not  change in  the  foreseeable  future.  One of  the  key advantages  of  the 
minimum harmonisation approach has been the possibility to retain existing provisions, 
but  these  were  not  always  consumer-specific  rules  –  in  some  instances,  generally 
applicable rules offered a higher level of protection to a consumer than the harmonised 
standard.
On the whole, the directive re-enacts much of what is already in the Consumers Acquis, 
with  some  tidying-up  of  the  terminology.12 There  are  also  a  few scattered  additional 
10 Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
11 J. M. Smits, ‘Full Harmonization of Consumer Law? A Critique of the Draft Directive on Consumer Rights’  (2010) 18 ERPL 5,14.
12 G. Howells and R. Schulze (eds),  Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Munich: Sellier, 2009); B. Jud and C. 
Wendehorst (eds), Neuordnung des Verbraucherprivatrechts in Europa? (Vienna: Manz, 2009); H.-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘Crónica  
de una muerte anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 
471–519; H. Schulte-Nölke and L. Tichy´ (eds),  Perspectives for European Consumer Law (Munich: Sellier, 2010); P. Rott and E. 
Terryn, ‘The Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ 3(2009)  Zeitschrift für Europäsiches Privatrecht 456-488 and C. Twigg-
Flesner and D. Metcalfe,  ‘The Proposed Consumer  Rights  Directive  – Less Haste,  More Thought?’3 (2009)  European Review of  
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provisions, but these do not significantly raise the overall level of consumer protection. 
The  main  difference  is  the  deletion  of  the  minimum  harmonisation  clause,  and  the 
elevation of much of what is currently a minimum standard to full harmonisation. General 
contract law at national level could turn out to be more favourable in some respects than 
the legislation transposing the directive, leading to the paradox that it may be better for an 
individual  not  to  be  a  consumer.  This  possibility  has  rightly  been  criticised  by 
Wilhelmsson as a “legal mess”, and it is regrettable that insufficient thought appears to 
have been given to this outcome so far.13
In addition, one problems identified with the current Acquis are the problems caused by 
the transposition of directives into national law, partly due to the existence of minimum 
harmonisation clauses, but also simply due to errors and omissions made by the Member 
States during this process: this means that the national legislation transposing a directive 
could  be  found  in  all  sorts  of  different  places;  this  much  is  acknowledged  by  the 
Commission, which tries to present this as a positive aspect, arguing that transposition of a 
directive  would  “allow  a  smoother  implementation  of  the  Community  Law  into  the 
existing  national  contract  laws  or  consumer  codes”  and  give  Member  States  enough 
leeway to maintain existing provisions which already comply with the objectives of the 
directive.  But  the end result  will  still  be diverse  national  laws,  potentially  using very 
different language or concepts, to give effect to the directive. Whilst the directive produce 
the same level of consumer protection across the EU in respect of the areas it regulates, 
consumers and traders would still need to identify the corresponding national legislation if 
they were ever in a position where recourse to the law became necessary, or seek advice 
on the relevant  national  law – one of  the matters  which harmonisation  is  intended to 
reduce. The Commission’s view that “the implementation of a directive may give rise to a 
single  and  coherent  set  of  law at  national  law which  would  be  simpler  to  apply  and 
interpret by traders” sound overly optimistic.
Information disclosure in the CRD
The regulatory technique based on the provision of information lies at the hart of the 
CRD: by requiring that a huge number of information is made available to consumers, it 
aims to reduce the information gap, giving the consumer the choice between different 
kinds  of  goods  and  services  in  an  informed  way.  This  according  to  the  traditional 
informational  approach  for  consumer  we have  introduced in  the  section before about 
“Propensity to read, information overload and information processing” to clarify that this 
approach  is  not  satisfactory  in  the  light  of  results  of  the  studies  in  economics  and 
psychology regarding consumer behaviour.
A. Legal framework
The pre-contractual information obligations are covered in Articles 5-8. These articles 
are divided across two chapters: Chapter II, comprising only the consumer information for 
contracts other than distance or off-premises contracts, while Articles 6-8 of Chapter III 
Contract Law 368–391.
13 T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Full Harmonisation of Consumer Contract Law?’ ZeuP (2008) 16, 225, 229.
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cover  the  ground  in  the  present  legal  framework,  namely  the  consumer  information 
obligations for distance and off-premises contracts.
Despite  the  consumer  information  duties  only  being  in  four  articles,  they  involve 
extensive detailed rules encompassing a total of 64 sub-paragraphs containing a number of 
rules relating, for instance, to the scope of application, the content of the information, and 
when the information is to be given by the trader.
A new feature of the CRD with respect to the present consumer acquis is the inclusion 
in Article 5 of an information obligation to be fulfilled by the trader in a contract other 
than a distance or an off-premises contract. Precisely, the obligation applies in sales and 
service contracts not concluded in a manner that features all the required characteristics of 
either a distance or off-premises contract (Articles 2(7) and 2(8), respectively).
a) Distance and off-premises contracts
The information to be given in distance and off-premises contracts is covered in Article 
6(1). This article consists of 20 different points of information, each of which contains 
further details as to the information to be given.
The  new  information  requirements  represent  a  radical  change  to  the  information 
requirements for doorstep selling (previously limited only to information on the right of 
withdrawal), but also expands upon the catalogue of information to be provided under the 
Distance Selling Directive. The list of information under Article 6(1) can be divided into 
mandatory and relevant information, though in both instances the information provided 
forms an integral  part  of the contract  and cannot  be altered  absent  express agreement 
(Article 6(5)).
b) Other contracts
As  before  suggested,  Article  5(1)  contains  a  catalogue  of  information  obligations 
concerning eight  different  subject  matters,  each  in  turn consisting  of  various  different 
elements. However, the extent to which the information on these matters is to be provided 
is limited by a number of factors: firstly, the information need not be provided if it already 
apparent  from  the  context,  secondly,  in  some  instances  some  of  the  information 
requirements need not be fulfilled because they are not applicable either to the subject 
matter or the conditions of the contract. Finally, the notion of ‘appropriate information’ 
applies to the main characteristics of the goods and services: what is considered to be 
appropriate is not clear and it depends on the manner in which the information is presented 
and the nature of the goods or service.
B. Analysis
The disclosure  paradigm adopted  by the  CRD represents  an  old  and unsatisfactory 
regulatory technique14. In our view, the same instruments of disclosure have not helped 
14 O. Bar Gill,  Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (OUP 2011).S. I. Becher, Behavioral, 
Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts,  Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 68, 2007 at 131. Accessed December 2012 at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016002. O. Ben-Shahar, ‘The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in  Contract Law’,  European Review of  
Contract Law, 5(1), 2009 1-28. R. B. Korobkin, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability’, University of  
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consumers  in  the  past,  are  highly unlikely  to  deliver  any benefit,  impose  unnecessary 
costs,  and  might  even  have  unintended  harms.   In  particular,  CRD’s  pre-contractual 
disclosures  are  likely  to  fail  because  consumers  will  not  pay  attention  to  them.  As 
explained in the first  part  of this  Chapter,  consumers  do not pay attention to standard 
forms, neither long nor short, in plain language or in legalese, written or oral, separately 
signed or unified into one document, handed out in advance or ex post. The failure of 
consumers  to  attend  to  mandatory  information  disclosure  has  been  documented 
thoroughly, in area after area of consumer transactions and financial literacy.15
It is surprising that disclosure mandates in the CRD are still written without regard for 
the  studies  about  people’s  cognitive  abilities  and  literacy  levels.  They  disregard 
consumer’s reluctance to read texts that are unfamiliar and imposing:  they do not read the 
disclosures  because  good  things  will  rarely  emerge  from  this  exercise.  It  is  time 
consuming, dull, largely irrelevant, and with the load of disclaimers and warnings it rarely 
conveys any good news, thus draining their enthusiasm from the transaction. Besides, if 
they read something they dislike, would they switch to another trader?
This does not imply that disclosure, as a regulatory tool, can never work. If mandated 
disclosure is to help consumers, a new approach must be adopted – one very different 
from the traditional  paradigm that  the  CESL implements,  and with far  less  ambitious 
goals. As discussed before,  effective information tools come in very simple,  aggregate 
metrics that consumers can easily understand and compare, like total cost of ownership or 
satisfaction  ratings.  Nevertheless,  these  fundamental  insights  have  been  totally 
underestimated in the design of these provisions.
The right of withdrawal
A. Legal framework
Generally,  European  Law  gives  consumers  the  right  to  withdraw  from a  range  of 
contracts  for  goods  and  services.16 As  two  authors  note:  “European  law  in  this  way 
recognizes  the  consumer’s  right  to  withdraw.  There  is  no  such  generic  right  in  the 
common law of contract or in the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States.
The adoption of the right to withdraw serves a number of purposes in EU Law, such as: 
protecting consumers from aggressive sales tactics, encouraging consumers to engage in 
long-distance purchases, encouraging consumers to use the internet to make purchases, 
and enabling consumers to understand complex contracts.17 The right to withdraw has its 
origins in the national legal systems of various European countries, but in recent years it 
has emerged as a prominent feature of European contract law.18
Chicago Law Review, 70(4) 2003, 1203-1295. N. K.  Malhotra,  ‘Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer  
Decision-Making’ Journal of Consumer Research, 10(4), 1984, pp. 436-440. J. Jacoby, ‘Perspectives on Information Overload’, Journal  
of Consumer Research, 10(4), 1984, pp. 432-435.
15 D.  G.  Baird,  ‘Pre-contractual  Disclosure  Duties  Under  the  Common  European  Sales  Law’,  Accessed  on  22  February 2013  at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Baird%20Paper.pdf
16 Similar  rights  are also provided  by the  directive  which protects  the consumer  in case  of  contracts  made at doorstep (Directive  
85/577/EEC), the timeshare directive (94/47/ECC), the directive concerning distance selling regulations (Directive 2002/65/EC) and the 
directive concerning consumer credit (Directive 87/102/EEC).
17 M. Loos, ‘Rights of Withdrawal’ in Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, edited by Geraint Howells and Reiner 
Schulze (Munich: Sellier 2009) at 237-78.
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A series of directives issued between 1985 and 2008 introduced the right of withdrawal 
in transactions relating to life insurance,  real estate timeshares,  and distance selling of 
goods and financial  services,  and consumer credit.  In addition,  Chapter 3 of the DCR 
recognizes a general right to withdraw for most distance and off-premises contracts (CEC 
2008). The right to withdraw also appears in the 2008 draft Common Frame of Reference 
for European Private  Law.19 In all  of these documents,  the right of withdrawal simply 
provides the consumer the right to cancel the contract within a period of time after the 
contract has been entered. The consumer must return the goods or discontinue use of the 
services, and in return the seller must refund the purchase price. Typically but not always, 
the consumer must pay the cost of depreciation, if any.
In the CRD, the right to withdraw applies to “distance contracts” (where the seller and 
consumer make the sale using a means of “distance communication” such as a telephone 
or  the  internet)  and  “off-premises  contracts”  (where  the  seller  and  consumer  conduct 
business in each other’s physical presence but away from the premises of the business; 
CEC 2008, art.  2(6)-(8)). The seller  is  obliged to inform the consumer of the right to 
withdraw at the time of contracting (art. 9(b)). Now, the consumer has a 14-day period in 
which to exercise the right to withdraw. Withdrawal is entirely discretionary given that the 
consumer  is  not  required  to  provide  a  reason for  withdrawing from the  contract  (art. 
12(1)).  After  the consumer exercises  the right  to withdraw, the seller  must  return any 
payments received within 30 days (arts. 16, 17(1)). Moreover, the consumer bears the cost 
of returning the goods unless the seller has agreed otherwise. The consumer is also liable 
for “any diminished value of the goods resulting from the handling other than what is 
necessary to ascertain the nature and functioning of the goods,” unless the trader did not 
give notice of the right to withdraw prior to contracting. Likewise, the consumer is not 
charged  for  any  benefit  he  derived  prior  to  withdrawal.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  service 
contracts, the consumer is not liable for the cost of performance prior to the withdrawal 
from contract.20
B. Analysis
Behavioural economics helps us to identify three cases in which granting a withdrawal 
right may be justified given that there are information asymmetries at the time of contract 
formation, but also exogenous distortions of the consumer’s preferences and endogenous 
distortions.21 Consumers’  contract  decisions  can  be  distorted  by  various  external 
influences: surprise, time pressure and psychological entrapment might all contribute to a 
particular  contract  decision  being  based  on  the  distorted  preferences  of  a  consumer. 
Interestingly,  this  strategy is  also based on the idea  that  consumers,  sometimes,  make 
purchases in emotionally “hot” states that, in a cooler and more rational state, they would 
not make. In particular, the right to withdraw allows consumers to reframe their choices 
and gives them an opportunity for a rational reconsideration to overcome the influence of 
18 O. Ben-Shahar and Eric A. Posner, ‘The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law’, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January  
2011), at 115-148.
19 C. Von Bar, et al. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Munich: 
Sellier 2008).
20 There are numerous exceptions to the right of withdrawal. For distance contracts, examples include goods and services whose prices  
depend  on  fluctuations  in  financial  markets,  customized  goods,  sealed  recordings  and  software  that  have  been  unsealed  by  the  
consumer, newspapers and other periodicals, gaming and lottery services, and auction contracts (CEC 2008, art. 19(1)).
21 J. M. Smits, ‘The Right to Change Your Mind? Rethinking the Usefulness of Mandatory Rights of Withdrawal in Consumer Contract  
Law’ (2011) 29 Penn State International Law Review, 671, 684.
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impulsive choice: it removes consumers from pressure by salespeople and gives them time 
to consider the contract in emotionally neutral situation.22
In  this  respect,  the  CRD  show  to  have  been  influenced  by  the  arguments  of  the 
behavioural economics in extending the right to withdraw so that the consumer has now a 
period of 14 days to withdraw from a distance or off-premises contract, without giving any 
reason, and without incurring, generally, any cost.23 Evidently, this measure expresses a 
soft  paternalistic  approach  towards  the  consumer,  because  it  aims  to  give  time  for 
reflection and to correct impulsive choices.
The  most controversial point with both the CRD and the CESL’s rights to withdraw 
rule concern the mandatory nature of this right. Some authors note that, in the absence of a 
mandatory duty, prime retailers routinely offer a right to withdraw, while low-end retailers 
do not: a voluntarily designed right to withdraw, thus, enables sellers to signal superior 
quality and reliability,  while mandatory right to withdraw destroys this possibility. 24 In 
addition,  a  mandatory  right  to  withdraw reduces  sellers’  ability  to  offer  differentiated 
prices. Some consumers purchase extended return periods, while other consumers waive 
the right to return the product altogether in exchange for a lower price. (e.g. consumers 
buying  cheap  non-refundable  airfares).  Mandatory  right  to  withdraw according  to  the 
CESL and the CRD will force these consumers to pay for a feature that they do not want.
The Common European Sales Law (CESL)
On 11 October 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a Common 
European Sales  Law (CESL), which traders  may choose to  use to  govern  their  cross-
border contracts. It covers the sale of goods, the supply of digital content and some related 
services.25 With its proposal, the European Commission aims to improve the establishment 
and the functioning of the internal market by facilitating the expansion of cross-border 
trade  for  business  and  cross-border  purchases  for  consumers.  This  objective  can  be 
achieved in the view of the Commission by making available a self-standing uniform set 
of contract law rules including provisions to protect consumers, the Common European 
Sales Law, which is to be considered as a second contract law regime within the national 
law of each Member State.26
Effectively, the European Commission has made two separate proposals: one law for 
traders to use when selling to consumers;  and one law for businesses selling to other 
businesses. Under the current law, as set out in the Rome I Regulation, a trader that directs 
its  activities  to  a European Member  State  must  comply with the mandatory consumer 
protection laws of that state. This may be a problem in internet and other distance selling 
where traders are dealing with consumers from many different states at once. Under the 
proposal, in cross-border sales, the trader could offer to contract under the new system of 
22 Office of Fair Trading, Doorstep selling. A report on the market study 2004, OFT 716.
23 Art. 9 Parliament and Council Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 22.11.2011 L 304/64-88.
24 O Bar Gill, O. B. Shahar ‘Regulatory techniques in consumer protection: a critique of the Common European Sales Law’, Working  
paper presented at the Conference on European Contract Law: A Law-and-Economics Perspective, April 27, 2012. Accessed 1 June  
2012 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/OBS-OBG%20paper_0.pdf
25 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, Brussels, 11.10.2011, 
COM (2011) 635 final, 2011/0284 (COD).
26 In July 2010 the Commission published a Green Paper, “Policy options for progress towards a European contract law for consumers  
and businesses” setting out a number of possible options to address the challenges presented by contract law to cross border trade.  
COM(2010)348 final 1 July 2010.
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consumer contract law set out in this provisions. The trader would state that the goods 
were  offered  under  the  CESL and would  provide  a  short  information  leaflet  about  it 
(around a page and a half long). If the consumer explicitly agreed, the law governing the 
contract would then be the CESL rather than a national system.
The key aim of the Commission’s proposal for a new set of contract law rules for cross-
border contracts  was to remove barriers to cross-border trade.  The evidence,  however, 
suggests that the CESL will not promote cross-border trade and will be time-consuming 
and  cumbersome  to  negotiate  and  implement.27It  is  possible  to  identify  the  following 
recurring critiques in legal scholarship:
‒ Evidence of need: some authors do not believe that sufficient need for the proposal 
had  been  demonstrated.  They  questioned  the  Commission’s  claims  that  the 
different contract laws of each Member State currently act as a barrier to trade or 
certainly not a sufficiently serious barrier to warrant such a complex and wide-
ranging proposal.  Other more significant barriers existed and they would not be 
dealt with by CESL.
• Legal  uncertainty:  some  authors  affirm  that  that  the  CESL  would  lead  to 
uncertainty and incoherence, placing an additional burden on the national judicial 
systems and on the EU’s Court of Justice.
• Confusion: a common concern is that the introduction of CESL would create more 
confusion for consumers and businesses, making it more difficult for businesses to 
agree contracts  and for consumers  to know their  rights when purchasing cross-
border.28
• Cost: scholars from the school of law and economics also suggest that the cost of 
the proposals would outweigh any possible benefits.29
Concerning the regulatory techniques for consumer protection the CESL maintains the 
traditional approach in requiring the provision of detailed information to the consumer and 
in extending their quantity without focusing on their format. Again, it does not effectively 
deal with the problem of information overload and it also increases the steps to enter the 
contract, thus, the sunk cost effect.
This is particularly evident with respect to the requirement of mandatory disclosure that 
is a standard staple of consumer protection: give people information to help them make 
better autonomous choices according to a dated paradigm. The interesting point consists in 
the fact that the CESL also include other techniques, based on the behavioural insights, for 
consumer protection, such as: mandatory pro-consumer arrangements, default rules, right 
to withdraw and, at the end, provides for optional standardized consumer contracts.
27 J. Smits, ‘The Common European Sales Law (CESL) Beyond Party Choice’ (April 2012). Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper  
No. 2012/11. Accessed on 22 February 2013 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039345.
28 Proposal for a Regulation of the EU Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, Brussels, 11.10.2011, COM 
(2011) 635 final, 2011/0284 (COD).
29 H.W. Micklitz, N. Reich, ‘The Commission Proposal For A Regulation on A Common European Sales Law (CESL)-Too broad or not  
broad enough?’ EUI Working Papers Law No. 2012/04.
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Information disclosure in the CESL
A. Legal framework
The CESL also mandates various mandatory disclosures, requiring informed parties to 
grant  the  consumer  a  number  of  information  before  he  enters  the  contract  (pre-
contractual), and supervises over voluntary disclosures to grant their integrity, with causes 
of action against deception and fraud. Article 23 requires sellers to make plain the basic 
attributes  of  what  they  are  selling.  The  seller  of  goods  has  a  duty  to  disclose  “any 
information concerning the main characteristics of the goods which [he] has or can be 
expected to have and which it would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing not to 
disclose to  the other  party”.  Whether  any particular  information needs to  be disclosed 
turns on all the circumstances and these include such things as the special expertise of the 
seller,  the  cost  to  the  seller  consumer  contracts  the  nature  of  the  information,  its 
importance to the buyer, and good commercial practice. This means that the seller has to 
explicitly  disclose  a  variety  of  terms,  ranging  from the  most  basic  (e.g.,  price,  fees, 
payment and delivery, duration) to the more specialized (e.g., conditions for termination, 
post-sale services, digital rights limitations, right to withdraw and also the governing law).
In addition, the CESL mandates a ‘duty of transparency’, which is achieved in several 
ways. Boilerplate terms have to be communicated “in plain intelligible language” (Artt. 
13-18, 20, 22, 27). Many of them have to be in writing (Artt. 82, 13 (3) (b), 13 (4) b). And 
drafters have “the duty to raise awareness” to terms that are particularly important-“a mere 
reference to them in the contract  document” is not sufficient  (Art.  18 for off-premises 
contracts). A separate and specific acknowledgement of assent is required, to ensure that 
information passed through. Thus, the consumer must receive not only the standard form 
contract  in  a  durable  medium,  but  also  a  separate  disclosure  regarding  the  right  to 
withdraw and its limitations (Artt. 17 (4), 19 (5) and 41 (3)).
It is important to note that the CESL now requires the sellers use a uniform ‘Standard 
Information Notice’, a two-page pre-drafted form that consumers must receive in writing, 
separate from the sellers’ standard form contract. This disclosure explains and highlights 
the “core rights” guaranteed by CESL, and provides a quick, two-paragraph tutorial of 
Sales Law.
The goals of this provision are far-reaching: “Consumers must be fully aware of the 
fact that they are agreeing to the use of rules which are different from those of their pre-
existing national law. The use of the Common European Sales Law should be an informed 
choice. The trader should (…) provide information on its nature and its salient features”.  30 
In practice, consumers will likely have to sign two forms: the contract and the consent to 
use the CESL. In addition, it  imposes requirements for distance contracts  or electronic 
contracts:  these  requirements  involve  specific  confirmatory  memoranda  and  specific 
acknowledgment of disclosures.
30 CESL, Articles 8 and 9 and Annex II.
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B. Analysis
CESL’s contract disclosures are likely to fail because consumers will not pay attention 
to them. As explained in the first part of this Chapter, consumers do not pay attention to 
standard forms, neither long nor short, in plain language or in legalese, written or oral, 
separately signed or unified into one document, handed out in advance or ex post. The 
failure of consumers to attend to mandated disclosures packaged in pre-drafted language, 
like ones CESL utilizes, has been documented thoroughly, in area after area of consumer 
transactions and financial literacy.31
Many  factors  account  for  this  “non-readership”  phenomenon.  First,  CESL  alone 
requires a hefty amount of disclosures; far too time consuming for shoppers to investigate 
in the course of routine sale transactions. The typical CESL consumer would take home a 
“packet”: the standard terms of the contract (embellished by specific terms that must be 
included); the right to withdraw disclosure; the actual withdrawal form; and the Standard 
Information Notice. In this respect, it is clear that the CESL will have detrimental effects 
on the level of consumer protection.
Interestingly, the same critique applies to certain U.S. Laws. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 
openly criticise the sector specific disclosure mandates that are common in US Law for 
certain products (cars, appliances, food, drugs, timeshares, credit and insurance). Correctly 
they question whether consumers,  even the most  educated ones,  are likely to read the 
Appendix, the Annex. The same applies to he CESL’s pre-printed boilerplate.32
To pose an example, consumers will affirm that they agree to use the CESL. But will 
they read the above-mentioned ‘Standard Information Notice’? And, if they read it, will 
they understand how it  differs  from national  law to be  affirmatively  choosing it  as  a 
feature of their transaction? How many consumers will actually read the tedious terms in 
the written affirmation or remote contracts and re-evaluate their choice? It is true that one 
additional form, one additional signature, an additional click-all these are not too costly 
and will not slow down the wheels of commerce. But such costless mechanical gestures 
are not very beneficial either. If the CESL were true to its “conscious choice” rationale, it 
would require more thorough and meaningful procedures that would guarantee more than 
an appearance of choice. Those, however, would impose a significant transaction cost.
Some authors underline that the disclosure paradigm mandatorily employed by CESL 
risks to be also costly,  because it  compounds the transactions costs,  with extra  forms, 
signatures,  clicks,  and  ceremony,  thus  extending  the  time  and  the  waste  involved  in 
standard form exchange. It could also be considered “harmful”, because the presumption 
of  “informed  consent”  may  weaken  the  effect  of  other  protections:  when  a  term  is 
disclosed, there is a presumption that the consumer is aware of it.33
31 D.  G.  Baird,  ‘Pre-contractual  Disclosure  Duties  Under  the  Common  European  Sales  Law’,  Accessed  on  22  February 2013  at  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Baird%20Paper.pdf
32 O Bar Gill, O. B. Shahar ‘Regulatory techniques in consumer protection: a critique of the Common European Sales Law’, Working  
paper presented at the Conference on European Contract Law: A Law-and-Economics Perspective, April 27, 2012. Accessed 1 June  
2012 at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/OBS-OBG%20paper_0.pdf
33 Before at note 42.
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Mandatory pro-consumer rules
A. Legal framework
The CESL is designed to provide consumers a high level of protection, and it features 
some regulatory techniques showing a paternalistic attitude, such as default rules and pro-
consumer  arrangements,  the  latter  concerning  substantive  contractual  rights,  remedies, 
formalities, formation procedures, disclosures, warranties, and interpretation. The CESL 
safeguards its consumer protections by according them a mandatory and non-disclaimable 
status. While Article 1 declares the basic norm of “freedom of contract” and the right of 
parties to exclude or alter any of the provisions of the law unless otherwise stated, the 
remaining Articles state otherwise, unequivocally.  In 31 different places,  the following 
sentence appears: “The parties may not, to the detriment of the consumer,  exclude the 
application of this Article [or Section, or Chapter] or derogate from or vary its effects”.34 
To exemplify, all of the buyer’s remedies are mandatory, as are the withdrawal rights, the 
disclosure rules, the interpretation rules, the restitution rules, the risk of loss provisions, 
some of the implied and express warranties, rules relating to notices and communications, 
interest for late payments, grace periods, all the prescription rules, and much more.35
In addition, the CESL bans a long list of terms by establishing that they are always 
considered unfair terms (i.e. black list. See the next Chapter about unfair terms). These 
include some of the most common choice of forum terms, such as mandatory arbitration or 
seller’s home court. They also include “asymmetric” arrangements, for example, when the 
consumer is bound but the seller is not, or notice periods that are more lenient to the seller, 
or remedies that are more forgiving to the seller. Some terms are banned more “softly” by 
presuming them to be unfair  (i.e.  grey list).  These banned terms are for example,  the 
limitations to buyers’ remedies, the one-sided termination rights, the terms allowing the 
seller to assign the contract to others, the terms requiring “excessive” advance payments 
and the restrictions on seeking supplies or repairs from third parties.
It is easy to say which elements of the contract are not mandatory. The “main subject 
matter  of  the  contract”  and the  price  are  excluded  from the  unfairness  tests,  and  are 
binding even if set unilaterally by the seller.36
B. Analysis
It is tempting to think that a pro-consumer mandatory regime would benefit consumers. 
Nevertheless,  the pro-consumer  terms in the CESL raise sellers’  costs  and sellers  will 
pass-on (at least some of) these increased costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
Evidently,  higher  prices  are  not  inherently  bad:  consumers  may  prefer  high-quality 
products with a high level of consumer protection, even if these high-quality, protection-
intensive products cost more. But consumers might also prefer to pay a lower price and get 
34 CESL, Articles 2, 10, 22, 27, 28, 29, 47, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 81, 92, 99, 101, 102, 105, 108, 135, 142, 148, 150, 158, 167,  
171, 177, 186.
35 CESL Arts. 2, 10 (3‐4); Ch. 2, Sec. 1 (10 articles); Ch. 2, Sec. 3 (4 articles); Arts. 28, 29;
Ch. 4 (8 articles); Arts. 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75 ( 2), 77; Ch. 8 (8 articles); Arts. 92 ( 2), 99
(3), 101, 102, 105; Ch. 11 (17 articles); Arts. 135, 142, 148 (2), 150 (2), 158, 167; Ch. 16, Sec. 3 (4 articles); Ch. 17 (6 articles); Art. 
186.
36 CESL, Article 80(2).
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lower quality products  with a lower level  of consumer protection.  People often waive 
warranty programs, or buy non-refundable items, or choose the slowest delivery option, or 
decline to insure, because they are cheaper. To exemplify, a thirty-day grace period, or a 
generous remedy, or easy no questions asked termination option, are surely beneficial to 
consumers, but they are also costly to sellers, resulting in higher prices. If most consumers 
prefer these perks, sellers would offer them and lure consumers with them.
The fact that they do not-and that the law needs to mandate them-suggests that most 
consumers  prefer  the  discount.  The  preceding  discussion  grounds  on  the  idea  that 
consumers as a group would benefit from strong protections once these protections are 
priced.  Indeed,  one  of  the  fundamental  objectives  of  the  CESL,  and  the  entire 
harmonization  project,  is  “to grant  access  justice  to  those who are  excluded from the 
market or to who face difficulties in making use of the market freedoms. European private 
law rules  have  to  make  sure that  the  weaker  parties  have and maintain  access  to  the 
market.” It is clear now that this measure surely increases the costs of the products, while 
it is unclear whether it would really grant access to justice for the consumers.
In  addition,  consumers  are  a  heterogeneous  group,  with  different  preferences  and 
different  budgets,  while  some  consumers  may  prefer  to  pay  high  prices  for  strong 
protections, others may prefer the low price and they are also heterogeneous with respect 
to  their  propensity  to  benefit  from  protection  itself.  Some  consumers  enjoy  a  given 
protection more than others. For example, the right to sue the seller in court rather than 
arbitration,  or  the  right  to  obtain  strong  remedies  for  breach,  is  more  valuable  to 
consumers who are systematically more likely to enforce these rights. To others, often the 
majority, the enhanced access to court and remedies are less beneficial: many consumers 
are not aware of their legal rights and protections, or waive them.
Indeed, the Euro barometer survey, cited and relied on by the Commission in proposing 
the CESL, shows that consumers report a preference for arbitration over litigation. Since 
sellers are generally unable to separate, in advance, the more v. less litigious consumers, 
all consumers will pay the price of the protections that only the few enjoys. Evidently, the 
wealthier consumers are systematically more likely to invoke the protections. People need 
to be informed about these rights, to have the sophistication to insist on compliance, and to 
afford  legal  advice.  The  poor,  the  elderly,  the  less  educated-those  for  whom  the 
protections  are  enacted  in  the  first  place  lack  the  information,  sophistication,  and 
resources. And yet, they bear an equal share of the cost.
To conclude, consumers may fail to make good decisions either because of asymmetric 
information, or because of imperfect rationality (and often the combination of the two). A 
rational, informed consumer would selectively bargain for the protections that are worth 
the added price.  Less sophisticated consumers  might  not fair  so well  in a laissez-faire 
environment:  they might  fail  to  appreciate  certain  risks or  powers,  and so they might 
underestimate the importance of certain protections; thus, when sophisticated sellers face 
such  consumers,  the  market  equilibrium  may  include  an  inefficiently  low  level  of 
consumer protection.
Thus,  the  problem with  the  CESL stays  in  the  excessive  number  of  pro-consumer 
mandatory  arrangements  that  risk  of  being  too  costly  for  consumers  in  a  period  of 
economic  crisis,  including  for  the poor  and elderly.  While  some key mandatory  rules 
would have been sufficient to grant an adequate level of consumer protection for the less 
sophisticated consumers.
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Pro-consumer default  rules
A. Legal framework
Because many of the pro-consumer arrangements in the CESL are mandatory, there is a 
lesser role  for default  rules. Still,  the CESL includes several  pro-consumer gap-fillers. 
Recognizing,  however,  that  standard default  rules are easily disclaimed by traders,  the 
CESL  bolsters  its  default  provisions  by  making  them  more  difficult  for  drafters  to 
unilaterally alter.  The CESL’s rules on conformity are a good example of pro-consumer, 
sticky defaults: they stipulate conformity requirements, including fitness for ordinary and 
particular purposes, but maintain that derogation from these standards “to the detriment of 
the consumer is valid only if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the consumer 
knew of the specific condition of the goods, or the digital content and accepted the goods 
or the digital content as being in conformity with the contract when concluding it”. Again,  
opt-out  is  allowed  only  after  the  consumer  expresses  conscious,  informed  consent. 
Contract  terms  are  often  ambiguous  and  require  interpretation.  Moreover,  the  CESL 
establishes  that  ambiguous  terms  in  consumer  contracts  will  be  interpreted  in  a  pro-
consumer way: “Where there is doubt about the meaning of a contract term in a contract 
between a trader and a consumer, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall 
prevail unless the term was supplied by the consumer”.
B. Analysis
Pro-consumer  defaults  in  consumer  contracts  have  only  limited  effect  because  the 
traders can easily replace them with standard form terms, without incurring any added 
transaction  costs,  and  often  without  even  alerting  people  and  raising  suspicion.  In 
consideration of this limitation, the CESL imposes special consent requirements.
This solution is therefore unsatisfactory for the following reasons. Consider the “no 
additional payments” default according to which the consumer has to express an explicit 
consent to the additional payment term. But, how difficult would it be for the seller to 
obtain the explicit  consent of the consumer? The latter  would simply need to sign her 
name on another line or, perhaps, even on a separate form.
It  is  thus  clear  that,  in  choosing  to  enact  these  provisions  as  default,  rather  than 
mandatory  rules,  the  CESL  surely  intended  to  preserve  some  room  for  freedom  of 
contract, but to safeguard against mindless opt outs. It requires that consumers “know” 
and pay special attention to a reversal of the defaults, but the law’s primary device for 
alerting people and informing them is mandated disclosure, and so the regulation of opt- 
outs is  merely another  disclosure requirement.  To those who believe  that  lengthy pre-
contractual  disclosures  are  effective  in  protecting  consumers,  this  “sticky  default” 
technique  has  obvious  appeal.  Again,  such  argument  does  not  take  into  adequate 
consideration the insight of behavioural economics about ineffective disclosures discussed 
before in this Chapter. Traders would figure out the disclosure templates that are regarded 
by courts as reasonable and use them to direct their clients away from the pro-consumer 
default rules.
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Conclusion
From our analysis it emerges that the CRD and CESL adopt regulatory techniques to 
protect  consumers  based  on  both  a  libertarian  approach  towards  the  consumer  (e.g. 
information  disclosure)  and a  paternalistic  one (for  example,  mandatory  pro-consumer 
arrangements).37 The  latter  is  present  in  his  various  forms  (hard  and soft).  Clearly,  it 
emerges a lack of clarity about the conceptual grounds of these provisions and confusion 
between regulatory strategies. In addition, the regulation based on nudging the consumer 
is limited and not well designed as in the case of the right of withdrawal. It would have 
been necessary to clarify the selected approach or approaches and, then, apply them in a 
more coherent framework.
Interestingly,  there is evidence that information disclosure protection remains central 
(indeed is enhanced) in both measures and this choice by EU institutions can be criticized 
on various grounds. First, extensive past experience in consumer protection - supported by 
the  results  of  behavioural  economics  introduced  in  the  first  sections  -  suggests  that 
standard  consumer  “informed  consent”  techniques  have  proven  to  be  unsatisfactory, 
especially  with  respect  to  information  (mandated)  disclosure.  Consumers  do  not  read 
contracts whose terms are beyond most people’s care, or understanding. Second, while 
novel approaches to the format of information disclosure are being experimented38, both 
the CRD and the CESL disclosure paradigms ignore these attempts to develop a “smarter” 
disclosure paradigm for consumers. In this respect, one may conclude that these measures 
are “missed opportunities” to “modernize” the legal framework for consumer protection. It 
is difficult to say that the CESL Standard Information Notice and other documents would 
increase consumers’ propensity to read: on the contrary,  given the amount of pages at 
issue, they would probably decrease consumers’ willingness to read. Thus, our conclusion 
is  that  the  Consumer  Rights  Directive  and  the  CESL  would  not  enhance  consumer 
confidence in the internal market.
Evidently, the adoption of a sort of “EU label for consumer contracts” represents the 
most relevant innovation brought by the CESL in the field of consumer protection.
The  rules  contained  in  the  CESL  will  contribute  to  the  supply  of  an  optional 
standardized contract, or better a variety of standardized optional contracts for goods and 
digital contents. Precisely, the mechanism of the CESL grounds on the fact that the CESL 
model contract in B2C relations may not be chosen partially, but only in its entirely (Art. 8 
(3) of the Proposal). Moreover, business to consumer (B2C) contracts under the CESL is 
mainly subject to mandatory rules in favour of consumers (terms can be modified only if 
they are more favourable). Finally, all the other contract terms – except fro individually 
negotiated  terms)  are  subject  to  the  unfairness  test.  This  leads  to  a  quasi-mandatory 
standardization.
The underlying  idea is  that the CESL will  ensure that  consumers  who enter  into a 
transaction receive a contract with high-quality terms and that this “quality brand” will 
make makes cross-border purchases more attractive for consumers (see Recital 11 of the 
Proposal). It is correct that consumers do not read standard form contracts and this they do 
not know whether they are offered high quality or low quality terms and they do not relate 
37 O Bar Gill, O. B. Shahar ‘Regulatory techniques in consumer protection: a critique of the Common European Sales Law’, Working  
paper presented at the Conference on European Contract Law: A Law-and-Economics Perspective, April 27, 2012. Accessed 1 June  
2012 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/OBS-OBG%20paper_0.pdf
38 C.  Sunstein,  ‘Memorandum for  the  heads  of  executive  departments  and  agencies’,  Title:  ‘Informing  Consumers  through  Smart  
Disclosure’,  8  September  2011.  Accessed  at  23  July  2012  at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-
agencies/informing-consumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf
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price with terms’ quality. In this sense, standardisation could be a solution to the problem 
of reading costs of both parties.39
A. Standardized Consumer Contracts
In general,  contracts  are standardized where across different (though not necessarily 
all) traders and customers in a given market, individual contracts mainly consist of the 
same  pre-defined  boilerplate  identifiable  by  the  same  label,  allowing  for  individual 
variations only to a very limited extent, in particular regarding the quality and quantity of 
the contract goods and the contract price.40
Contracts standardization has received some attention in scholarly and policy debate 
and it has been indicated as a technique for consumer protection grounding on the insights 
of behavioural  research.  The point  is that standardized contracts  can help to solve the 
information  problem  that  is  the  main  cause  of  imbalanced  relationship  between  the 
consumer  and the  traders  (e.g.  problems  concerning  the  scarce  propensity  to  read  the 
contractual terms or to understand them). And this technique can also be helpful to solve 
the reading problems and other cognitive biases of consumers in this respect as discussed 
in the first sections (e.g. sunk cost effects). For example, a standardized contract drafted 
by a public authority relieves the consumer from the need to read it and to understand it: 
consequently,  this  strategies  represent  a  solution  of  the  information  problem  and 
contribute to overcome the before illustrated consumer biases related to contracts (lack of 
attention,  understanding and other biases). One author suggests that legislatures should 
contemplate  drafting  standard  form  contracts  for  specific  business  sectors  in  which 
consumers are especially vulnerable to enhance the quality of standard terms, especially 
since  consumers  cannot  be  expected  to  discipline  the  market.41 Another  scholar  also 
suggests  that  a  set  of  default  terms  might  be  proposed  for  specific,  relatively 
homogeneous,  industries by the administrative authority.  Sellers would have to specify 
where they depart from the pre-drafted terms.42
The key issue is how such a measure would be designed in concrete: there are several 
types of model forms: they could be drafted by Parliaments,  regulatory agencies or by 
public  authorities  protecting  the  interest  of  consumers,  such  as  the  Consumer 
Ombudsman, or consumer authorities. Often, private organisation drafts these models in 
negotiations by business and consumer interest representatives (self-regulation), while in 
some cases these private bodies are stimulated by public authorities (i.e. co-regulation). 
This stimulation can be regarded as co-regulation, a form of self-regulation. It corresponds 
to  the  new  governance  approach  that  is  becoming  more  prevalent  in  regulation. 
Representatives  of  both  parties  to  the  contract  can  be  requested  or  even  required  to 
negotiate  a  model  set  of  standard  terms.  In  the  case  of  consumer  contracts,  these 
39 A. L. Wickelgren,  Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form Contracts, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics JITE, Volume 167, Number 1, March 2011, pp. 30-44(15).
40 T. Ackermann  Public Supply of Optional Standardized Consumer Contracts: A Rationale for the Common European Sales Law? 
(2012) Paper presented at the Conference on European Contract Law: A Law-and-Economics Perspective University of Chicago, 27-
28April, 2012. Accessed on January 2, 2013 at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Ackermann%20paper.pdf
41 M. A. Eisenberg, (1985). Text Anxiety. Southern California Law Review, 59(2), pp. 305-311.
42 S. I. Becher, (2007). Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts. Louisiana Law
Review, 68(1), pp. 117-179. (2008).  The same author: Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to  
Be Met. American Business Law Journal, 45(4), pp. 723-774.
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negotiations are usually conducted between trade and consumer organisations, and some 
public entity.43
B. CESL
Having in mind the conceptual framework introduced before, the CESL rules about 
consumer contracts can be understood as a form of supply by public authorities - the EU 
Commission -  of an optional  standardized  model  (or optional  standardized models)  of 
contract for businesses and consumers. Such optional standardized contract is a body of 
rules that can in principle only be adopted or rejected as a whole and at best allows for 
limited variations. Indeed, the notion of optional standardized contracts supplied by states 
is not new: in the field of company law, states (and, more recently,  the EU) habitually 
provide optional standardized contracts with a particular name.44
Precisely, CESL rules for consumer contracts are bound to be uniform to a large extent. 
But, the wealth of mandatory rules in favour of consumers, combined with a rigid policing 
of standard terms, imposes a particular model of high-quality contracts (at correspondingly 
high prices) on market participants that may suit the preferences of some consumers, but 
drives out low-quality contracts (at lower prices) for which demand may also exist.
However, what could be regarded as undue restrictions of contractual  freedom may 
possibly turn out as requirements for the development of optional standardized consumer 
contracts  under  a  EU,  or  “the  EU-label”.  While  not  precluding  cheaper  low-quality 
contracts  under  another  label,  European  contracts  may  allow  to  satisfy  demand  by 
consumers with a preference for high-quality contracts where otherwise, due to adverse 
selection driven by reading costs, only low-quality contracts would be offered.
This label will work only if the parties of the contract – better the trader – will decide to 
opt-in for the CESL and there are serious concerns that this will happen.
43 H. Collins (Ed.) Standard Contract Terms in Europe: A Basis for and a Challenge to European Contract Law, (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International 2008) at 105.
44 G. Hertig and J. A. McCahery,  A Legal Options Approach to EC Company Law (2006). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics 
Working  Paper  No.  2006-01.  Accessed  on  January  3,  2013  at  SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=882388  or  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.882388
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